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competition regulators throughout the EU 
and lose access to the National Competition 
Authorities database. This could have an 
impact on identifying and enforcing future 
multinational cartels in the financial services 
sector. It will also need to be considered 
who the future policy makers for UK 
competition law are or could be and the 
relative weighting between competition 
law and financial crime regulation in 
the future. Will there be a conflict post 
Brexit for policy makers between opening 
up the UK to international markets and 
increasing regulation for financial crime? 
This remains to be seen but will need to be 
watched carefully by the UK government 
and competition law and financial crime 
regulators.
points for practitioners
The fines levied against the asset management 
companies in this case are significant because 
they represent the first use of the FCA’s 
competition law powers since April 2015. The 
fines demonstrate that the FCA is willing to 
use its competition enforcement powers in the 
financial services sector and should be seen as 
a warning that the FCA is keen to comply with 
its competition objective.
This case also demonstrates that the cartel 
leniency provisions, previously operated only 
by the CMA, are working well for the FCA 
in the financial services sector. It is essential 
for future financial cartels that there is 
sufficient awareness of these provisions to 
tempt a cartel member to take evidence to 
the regulator.
From a compliance perspective, for both 
advisers and financial sector businesses, 
the competition law fines by the FCA 
demonstrate the need for further vigilance 
in relation to exchanges of information 
between competitors. Significantly, the 
FCA found in its decision that disclosure of 
competitive intentions between competitors 
can amount to a concerted practice even 
where the recipient of this information 
does not act on that information; simply 
the acceptance of this information will be 
sufficient to establish a concerted practice.
Finally, the FCA’s competition powers 
should be viewed alongside the obligation 
to self-report under Principle 11 of the 
FCA’s manual Principles for Businesses, 
where regulated firms have to bring their 
own actual and possible contraventions 
of competition law to the FCA’s attention. 
This further demonstrates that these fines 
should be seen as a warning shot to financial 
services businesses of the FCA’s competition 
law powers.  NLJ
O
n 22 May 2019, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) 
published the full text of a 
decision it made in February, 
in which it found three asset management 
firms to be in breach of competition law (the 
decision). The FCA has had competition 
powers since April 2015 when it was given 
the power to enforce competition law in 
the financial sector concurrently with the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). 
However, this is first example of  the FCA 
using its competition enforcement law 
powers and the fact that its competition law 
investigation has resulted in fines is likely to 
bolster the FCA’s confidence in this area.
The case involved a cartel of three asset 
management firms, whose employees acted 
together to share price sensitive information 
during an initial public offering and a 
placing, shortly before the share prices were 
set. This sharing of strategic information 
allowed the three firms to know each other’s 
plans during the initial public offering or 
placement, when they should have been 
competing for the shares. The fines imposed 
by the FCA in its decision follow its market 
study, commenced in October 2015, into 
the UK asset management sector. That 
study identified evidence of ‘weak price 
competition in a number of areas of the asset 
management industry’ and prompted closer 
scrutiny of investment consultancy, fiduciary 
management services and investment 
platforms. The UK’s asset management 
industry is the second largest in the world, 
managing around £6.9 trillion of assets, 
according to the FCA’s decision.
Two of the three asset management firms 
were subject to FCA fines for breach of the 
Chapter 1 prohibition of the Competition 
Act 1998 and Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union. 
Hargreave Hale Limited was fined £306,300, 
River and Mercantile Asset Management 
was fined £108,600. The third firm, Newton 
Investment Management Limited (Newton) 
and its parent company the Bank of New 
York Mellon, were each given immunity from 
fines because Newton acted as a whistle-
blower. Cartels are notoriously difficult to 
spot and once identified, they are extremely 
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A competition law first
As the FCA fines its first cartel, Diana Johnson 
considers the significance for competition lawyers
challenging to prove. Therefore, the FCA 
operates a leniency policy, where a whistle-
blower is encouraged to come forward to the 
regulator with evidence of a cartel in return 
for immunity from prosecution.
The use of the leniency provisions in 
this case demonstrates their value because 
it is extremely unlikely that, without the 
involvement of a whistle-blower, the FCA 
would have been able to gather enough 
evidence to bring charges against the 
cartel members. It would be wise of the 
competition law regulators in the financial 
sector, the CMA and the FCA, to consider 
ways of increasing the profile and awareness 
of the leniency provisions among financial 
institutions and their staff, as this may aid 
the notification of a cartel in the future. 
FCA competition law powers
The FCA has had competition law powers 
since April 2015 when legislative changes, 
enacted in the wake of the LIBOR crisis, 
came into force. The most significant 
legislative enactment was the Financial 
Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which 
conferred competition powers on the FCA. In 
particular, the Act inserted a new provision 
into the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 which places an obligation on the 
FCA to consider, before using certain of its 
powers as financial regulator, whether its 
competition powers are more appropriate 
and, if so, to use them instead. This new 
competition objective is now one of the FCA’s 
three operational objectives and it makes 
the FCA one of the few financial regulators 
in the world with a core objective to promote 
competition. The new competition objective 
was a significant change of direction 
and policy for the UK’s financial services 
regulator. The FCA’s new competition powers 
are to be used concurrently with those of the 
previously sole competition regulator in the 
UK; the CMA. Both of these relatively new 
regulators have had to learn how to work 
together in an effective manner over the past 
few years, in order to combat financial crime.
Brexit—possible impact
The FCA’s first use of its new competition 
law powers should be viewed against the 
backdrop of Brexit and the possible changes 
to the UK competition regime that may 
occur. One key change that Brexit may bring 
to the FCA’s competition law enforcement 
capability is that the UK could lose the 
current co-operation with the other national 
